The Perry class FFG forms a capable undersea warfare . The Mk 1. 3 Mod 4 missile launcher provides secondary anti- air capability. Ships of this class are often referred to as . Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG- 7).
Raytheon and Havelsan Partner for FFG 7 Fleet Modernization with GENESIS Program. The cooperation of Havelsan and Raytheon in the marketing and implementation of the GENESIS program targets the FFG 7 fleets around the world. Poland to Extend, Improve Its FFG-7 Frigates. Apr 17, 2014 15:49 UTC by Defense Industry Daily staff. Sources: Dziennik Zbrojny, “Current status of the Polish naval modernization program”. These ships were originally conceived as a low- cost convoy escort (hence the original . They are particularly well suited to be a convoy escort and are Link 1. As older first- line destroyers and frigates were retired without replacement, however, the FFG 7 class has been integrated into the fleet, and numerous updates have been applied to permit it to cope with modern combat conditions. Construction materials include a steel hull with an aluminum superstructure. They are powered by a single shaft driven by 2 LM2. The ships active complement is about 1. PERRY- class frigates are primarily Undersea Warfare ships intended to provide open- ocean escort of amphibious ships and convoys in low to moderate threat environments in a global war with the Soviet Union. They could also provide limited defense against anti- ship missiles extant in the 7. They can also conduct independent operations to perform such tasks as counterdrug surveillance, maritime interception operations, and exercises with other nations. The $9. 4. 4 million lead- ship construction contract was awarded in October 1. Bath Iron Works Corp., Bath, Maine. Construction began in March 1. November 1. 97. 7. In February 1. 97. Is the Philippine Navy experiencing fund shortage for it's new.Navy awarded contracts to Bath Iron Works and to two Todd Shipyard Corporation yard in Los Angeles and the other in Seattle for construction of 1. Additional contracts were awarded to these yards. The Department of Defense estimated at September 3. FFG- 7 program would be $1. Two primary factors causing this increase were the addition of equipment that was not included in the original cost estimate such as a towed sonar, fin stabilizers and electronics equipment and much higher than anticipated shipbuilding costs. In order to meet this numerical requirement, stringent design controls were placed on the size and cost of the FFG- 7. Keeping down size and cost naturally led to some sacrifices in operational effectiveness, most of which appeared to be good management decisions. There were several areas where cost constraints may unduly effect operational effectiveness. Four matters are (1) the selection of the short- range AN/SQS- 5. The long life of warships (2. Over its lifetime, a warship will usually have mucn of its original equipment replaced by new, more capable systems. From the outset of the program, space, weight, and stability margins for growth in the FFG- 7 were minimized. The low margins were linked to the Navy's determination to restrain the size and cost of the ship. As a result, the FFG- 7, unlike most new warships, was unable to accommodate any new equipment beyond what was planned, unless compensating removals were. The two areas of particular concern were the reductions in (1) the service life weight margin, and (2) the future growth margin. Normally, the margin for a ship this size would be about 1. The margin in the FFG- 7, however, was only 5. The future growth weight margin is established to allow for unknown, but anticipated future modifications and new equipment approved by the Chief of Naval Operations. This margin is intended to make new ships more adaptable to changing requirements, the increasing threat, and changes in technology. In the FFG- 7, there was no margin for unplanned future ship characteristic changes which require additional space or increases in the ship's weight. These space limitations could make some necessary future improvements impractical if compensating equipment removals cannot be made. This, in turn, could affect the capability of the ship to perform its mission against an increasing enemy threat. Historically these modernizations have usually required space, weight, and stability reservations. The absence of weight and Space margins for fitting new equipment beyond those already planned meant added risk that needed mid- life modernizations to keep the ships abreast of an increasing threat throughout their life will prove impractical. Not only did the Navy fail to get a full measure of active service from these ships, but while active they contributed less in terms of effectiveness than less cost- constrained designs would have. Despite this, the FFG- 7 class is a robust platform, capable of withstanding considerable damage. Roberts struck a mine and USS Stark was hit by two Exocet cruise missiles. On 1. 7 May 1. 98. Iraqi fired Exocet SSMs hit the U. S. S. Stark (FFG- 3. On 1. 4 April 1. 98. U. S. S. Roberts (FFG- 5. TNT. The explosion heavily damaged propulsion systems and blew a nine- foot hole under the keel. In both attacks, the ships suffered intense fires aggravated by the all aluminum construction of the superstructure. Nevertheless, exceptional damage control efforts carried out by their crews kept both ships on the surface and enabled them to reach friendly ports in the Persian Gulf. The Stark returned to the United States on her own power and underwent repairs. The Roberts was transported to the United States on the Dutch- flag heavy- lift ship, Mighty Servant 2.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. Archives
January 2017
Categories |